Security

In this part of these notes, security is taken to have the meaning of the provision of devices and systems to protect a building and, by extension, those within it. The notes are added here in order to give some background to the thinking behind decisions on some upmarket housing and other development in Qatar. It is based on experience of a number of schemes but has been generalised and simplified in order to concentrate on principles that may be of use on a variety of projects. In general the notes will refer to houses, but the same principles are valid for different and larger uses.

The notes on this page complement those on the more social aspects of security made on the approach and other related pages. Here it is intended to deal with the more physical aspects of security.

The first point to make is that anybody working on buildings which require security consideration should take specialist advice. This will become an increasingly likely requirement, particularly for public developments.

The second point to make is that it is easy to get carried away worrying about the possibilities of attack. A degree of common sense should be used; but it is also worth reminding designers that there may be a certain amount of what appears to be fatalism in the views of their clients which should be borne in mind when considering requirements.

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Principles of secure design

This first diagram illustrates the simple principle behind building security – that optimal security is provided by conceiving the security system as a series of nested rings of secure elements which create a single, coherent system. In theory the rings should be considered as spheres, but let’s not complicate matters… These rings can represent a number of different devices and systems. The most common are:

• physical,
• electronic, and
• human or,
• a combination of any of the three.

The key points to remember with regard to the coherence of a secure system are that

• each ring must be conceptually and actually complete,
• the rings should be concentric and, generally, not overlap and that,
• where the ring is broken for access of any sort, there must be an absolutely reliable method of monitoring its state, and acting upon that information in a timely manner.

One of the systems for securing an entrance physically, is that used by some banks. In principle it is little different from a revolving door except that it can be locked down easily to prevent entrance or egress. There are also versions of it which contain the person moving through it so that the exit and entrance sides are never open at the same time. It is illustrated here by a device which rotates, always maintaining the integrity of the overall line of security. This may not appear to be relevant to residential housing but the principle can be used at different scales. In many houses, for instance, there is the possibility of using an entrance vestibule capable of providing the same secure principle but appearing to be a normal designed space of the house. In fact, this device is a logical entrance to a residence, acting not only as a visual introduction to the interior spaces while at the same time providing additional environmental control together with security.

In particular, bear in mind that the more coherent you believe the system to be, the more you have to be aware that you should rely on nothing. Equipment fails, people relax and the longer nothing breaches a security system, the less inclined people are to worry about future breaches of security.

Remember, systems need to be tested at all times on both a regular and irregular basis.

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Our perception of security

Most owners consider security as relating just to their building, as is notionally illustrated by this diagram. Commonly buildings have security systems fixed to monitor their openings and with movement sensors for the interior with, perhaps, a monitoring device at the entrance to the property. In the West this, together with a prominent face-fixed alarm, tends to satisfy those wishing to safeguard their property together with its contents. Yet some will argue that the presence of an external alarm suggests that the property contains valuables, making it a more desirable target, and that a scruffier, apparently un-alarmed property is more secure.

Evidence also shows that a well-lit property is less likely to be attacked, and that good quality locks represent money well spent. Having said that, it is also of note that many burglaries and house break-ins are opportunist in nature and do not reflect the provision – or the extent of the provision – of security to the property.

These comments relate mainly to attacks on buildings for the purpose of stealing goods from it. A second area of concern will be addressed later – attacks on buildings with a view to harming those within it.

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Vulnerability of buildings

This diagram is a notional illustration of the effective state of most buildings with regard to security. Few buildings are completely secure no matter how hard the designer tries. Although I suggest this to be a designer issue – and in this I am including specialist security design – to some extent this is a reflection on how far intruders are prepared to go in order to gain access. This, in turn, depends on their commitment, expertise, the time available for planning and execution, the perceived odds of their success, and a number of other variables such as lighting, overlooking, the opportunities for disposal and so on.

Of course, it is also a reflection of the extent to which the owner maintains the security system and, in this, most owners rely on the integrity of a relatively small number of mechanical and electronic devices. Many Qataris also have servants who are either hired as guards or who are supposed to carry out this duty along with other duties in and around the property.

At its simplest, buildings are most vulnerable at their openings, usually doors and windows. We are advised that good quality mortice locks, dead-bolts, hinge bolts and the like set in a solid door and substantial door frame are sufficient to safeguard a door. The ability to see who is at the door with the aid of spy holes or, increasingly commonly, videophones or closed circuit television systems, improves the effectiveness of the door as a security device, and chains or opening restrictors give some comfort to owners though are not as strong as many imagine. In the West, letterboxes represent a weak point in the door though, in Qatar, mail is collected and a letterbox is unnecessary. I should also mention that doors are also the main route for exit by intruders, and a dead-lock can help thwart this. However, the truth is that doors are easier to break through than most people realise, but I don’t intend to deal with that here.

Windows are a very different proposition. Being made of glass they are inherently unsafe as security devices. However, when broken they make quite a noise and, on being broken, are immediately recognisable as such, both characteristics that give some form of alarm, albeit on or after the event. Specialist glasses can perform better, making it more difficult to break them, but their frames are still at risk and can be broken or disassembled. It is important to recognise that the glass and frame have to be seen as a single, integrated unit in their assembly and installation, and that the connection with the structure must be sound.

With both doors and windows, the main security design focus is on slowing down intruders as long as possible as, given enough time most assemblies can be broken through. In fact, this might also be taken for the focus of security design for the whole of the building.

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Theoretical secure system

What designers are attempting to achieve with their secure designs is illustrated in this diagram, a coherent system or series of systems around the private parts of their home, and with controlled access through those systems which are as transparent in use as possible to the owner, and secure against intruder access. Unfortunately, the secure design of such buildings is usually left to the end of the project when specialist advice is commonly sought. Yet, with some understanding of the principles, security can be greatly enhanced in the initial design stages and the building ‘hardened’ without recourse to later, complete electronic installations.

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Qatari security concerns

There is, in the Qatari psyche, a deeply rooted concern for security. Probably originating in the socio-political history of the peninsula with instability induced by the mobility of badu families, piracy and competing colonial powers, it seems to continue into the present, this traditional concern compounded by worries about the numbers of expatriates in the country, their own rapidly changing society and the political problems within the region. Given these pressures, it’s remarkable how sanguine most Qataris appear to be with regard to security. The concern is always there but is buttressed by the manner in which Qatari society is bonded, particularly when living together in distinct neighbourhoods with their particular characteristic for observing those who do not live within or have business in the area. Even when this is not the case, the majlis system acts as a positive bond based on the possession and distribution of information.

In addition to this there are a considerable number of policing agencies in Qatar, the knowledge of which also helps maintain a feeling of stability in the local population. In fact, Qatar feels a very safe country in which to live and work. There is relatively little crime and that which there is tends to be minor in character and carried out by expatriates. Nevertheless, Qataris are concerned about the security of their properties, and there is certainly enough disposable income spent on jewellery and consumer items to tempt thieves. But, more important than this, there remains an underlying concern to protect the family.

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Requirements for Qatari building users

Before moving on to the requirements for buildings, it would be a good idea to mention some of the aspects of security that relate to the way in which a Qatari owner might use his building.

In broad terms, residential buildings in Qatar are larger than those in Europe, more people use them, and there is considerable movement within and about them both from the extended family as well as servants and, in restricted areas, guests.

In addition to this there are likely to be significant amounts of consumer durables as well as jewellery and expensive clothing in the houses.

Elsewhere I have mentioned the British Police initiative which aims to provide designers with advice on hardening their projects against criminal attack. It is worth looking at from the point of view of the advice relating to buildings though there has been criticism of its policies relating to layout. I have written a little about this conflict here and elsewhere, the key thing to remember being that there are significant differences between Western and Gulf societies.

Because of the climate there is more use of doors and windows than a Western designer might anticipate, making the reliance upon both mechanical and electronic security devices problematic.

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Visibility

Good visibility of the building – particularly its external wall – is the first requirement for security. Not only should the building and its possible entrances be readily seen from outside, but this should be so day and night. In the case of housing for Qataris, there is an obvious problem with windows being seen from outside where a wall stands between viewers and windows due to the requirement for privacy. In this case it is fair to ask that the external entrances to the site – mainly doors, but it could include windows to, for instance, a majlis – be readily seen and lit. This accords very much with the natural requirements of a Qatari who would hope to ensure his building, particularly its entrance and majlis, are readily seen.

Those external walls which are not readily viewable should also be well lit, for instance in sikkat. The sikkat themselves should be lit but it is also sensible to ensure that the inside face of external walls should be illuminated so that any intruder may be seen against it from inside the building.

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Walls

The walls of the building itself are the next element for treatment. Doors and windows are the obvious recipients of an electronic alarm system and, to these should be added any openings where a wall-mounted air-conditioner is located. The difficulty with this is that wall-mounted air-conditioners vibrate heavily, so any system monitoring them needs to take account of this.

Despite Police advice, evidence from the news and, hopefully, part of their training, very rarely do designers consider their buildings from the point of view of the ease with which they can be climbed. While this has benefited the anti-climb paint and other similar industries, both boundary and building walls should be designed to resist climbing, particularly at ground floor level. This argument has two components:

• the design of the walls should be such that they do not incorporate features which constitute natural hand-holds, and
• there should be no additional features such as fall pipes and cabling that would enable an intruder to climb into a first floor or higher opening.

Most buildings are constructed of concrete with regard to their frames and infill of concrete blocks, then finished with a cement render. This provides a relatively smooth finish, free of handholds. With increased financial resources there is a tendency for stone facings to be introduced or for a mock ashlar effect to be created, both of which might produce horizontal grooves which might be used as finger-holds. While this might not prevent a determined or planned assault, it should put off opportunist attempts to climb into a building.

With regard to services on the external face of buildings there is a strong financial argument to face-fixing them in order to save money. This should be resisted.

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Glass

Careful consideration should be given to the quality and character of glass in the fenestration. Environmental concerns are likely to dictate double or triple glazing, and this may include glass structures which incorporate integral plastic membranes to reflect heat. In this case the glass system will be stronger than normal and more resistant to intentional breakage. Where there is no need for such a membrane for environmental reasons, it might still be a good idea to use one for its security implications.

Glass can come in a variety of types and, at least, it should – if accidentally or deliberately attacked – either not break, or break safely. By this it is meant that, in its broken form, it should not present a hazard. There are essentially three types of safety glass, one or another of which should be installed in any residential building:

• toughened or tempered,
• laminated, and
• wired glass.

Toughened glass has been heat treated and, when broken, is reduced to small, safe pieces. It is, however, liable to sudden breaking. Laminated glass comprises two or more sheets of glass fused to plastic membranes which keep the glass more or less in place when broken. Wired glass contains a mesh of wires within it which hold broken glass together. It is often associated with use in situations where there is a fire requirement.

Most countries have specific regulations relating to the use of glass in specific locations. My point here is to suggest that glass should be specified with regard to security, not just fire and accidental breakage. It is also worth mentioning here that there are a range of plastic sheets that fufill some if not all of the requirements of fire, accidental damage and security, and might be considered.

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Aggressive attack on a building

Some people are concerned to cater for deliberate attacks on them and their property. Designing in these circumstances is very much a specialist area in which advice should be sought prior to design work starting. Many factors must be considered which would not normally be the province of a building designer. Having said that, a degree of common sense can usefully be applied.

Security authorities will tell you that there is very little you can do against a determined attack. This assumes that the attacker has had time to reconnoitre and plan his attack. But what can be done is to ensure optimal consideration for obvious, likely problems with the intent of

• ensuring that the attack is recognised,
• slowing down an intruder,
• ensuring there is an element of surprise for the intruder,
• making sure an alarm or alarms are activated, capable of bringing response by the appropriate authorities,
• giving all inhabitants a chance to move to a place or places of safety, and
• taking appropriate, pre-planned action.

I should have included at the head of this list, if it is at all possible, the capability of identifying an attack before it launches – though, to a large extent, this is the province of the normal security organisations.

The first area to look at is the character of the likely attack. There are sufficient weapons in Qatar for these to be the main area of concern of most individuals worried about attacks against the person. Essentially we are talking about small arms – relatively low velocity, hand held guns. Many people own them and it is common to see them at various celebrations as well as being a popular and historically natural adjunct to camping and life in the desert. It follows from this that a number of guns are carried in cars if not on people’s persons.

Shots are not uncommon at various celebrations, though nothing like as common as in other Arab countries. Nevertheless there is the chance of spent bullets falling. There is little that can be done to protect against this eventuality. However, there is the possibility of bullets being directed at a building, in which case the building should be designed to resist them.

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Windows

The first of this pair of photographs, taken from inside a building in Qatar, shows the typical damage caused by the path of a bullet through an ordinary glass window. Note that the hole on the outer, entrance side of the window, is the size of the bullet, but that the spalling created on the inside of the glass by the bullet slowing as it moves through the glass creates, this typical cone-shaped hole.

In this photograph, a larger calibre bullet has been shot through the glass, this time from the inside – the far side of the glass – out, again making a similar cone-shaped hole in the glass, but this time also cracking the glass pane horizontally from side to side. I assume that the curtain was not drawn when the bullet passed through the glass as there appeared to be no damage to it.

Projectiles of this sort can readily pass through ordinary glass, and windows, by their very nature, tend to be relatively large and easy to hit targets. Although glass will slow a bullet slightly, it is unlikely to be sufficient to lessen or prevent injury to those hit by a missile passing through it. You should also note that these two examples are of single projectiles and do not reflect the damage which would be caused by an automatic firearm or, of course, anything more powerful.

Windows can be protected against missiles by three different methods used individually or in conjunction by:

• designing windows so that they are screened by a solid device in line with any possible direction of attack,
• installing bullet-proof glass; this is usually a sandwich of glass and plastic which slows down the bullet, dissipating its energy through the glass and plastic assembly, and
• providing additional devices to slow down or hold the missile before or after it hits the glass.

The provision of solid screening is an obvious enough precaution and accords with the natural desire for privacy. Many windows in Qatar are protected by concrete, grp or grc mushrabiya screens which might provide a degree of protection but can not be as effective as a total, solid screen.

As explained further down the page, glass may be installed that has a heat reflecting layer which may assist its missile-piercing qualities but, if missiles are to be prevented from entering the building, then a glass must be selected specifically for this purpose. In order to be fit for purpose a precise assessment of the likely type of weapon and ammunition must be made, its distance from the window and its angle of incidence on the glass in order to make an accurate specification of the glass. This can be difficult as there may be a wide variety of weapons to consider which will have different velocities and mass with widely differing impact characteristics against the glass.

At the same time as the glass is specified, the frames must also be considered. There are three reasons for this:

• firstly, the frame itself must be able to resist a missile,
• the frame must be able to retain the glass when the latter is hit by a missile, and
• the whole of the glass and frame assembly must stay more or less in place when the glass is hit. It is no use if the whole of the glass and frame assembly moves into the building due to its fixing being too weak.

Much of the above has to do with relatively small missiles being aimed at windows, but remember that weapons with a heavier impact on windows might be available to a determined attacker.

Mention has been made of devices that will slow down missiles before or after striking a window. Usually they are designed for the inside of windows and operate on the principle of a relatively opaque material held by belts which, when the material is struck, will permit some movement but are designed to bring the object to rest. They work on similar principles to car seat belts and are mainly intended to resist explosive attack.

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Wall construction

Much of these notes have related to windows as glass is an obvious focus for an attack, but it should not be forgotten that walls and doors must also be considered. The walls of Qatari houses are generally constructed of hollow concrete blocks rendered both sides. They will resist small arms but not sustained impact from automatic weaponry.

The same is true for doors. Most external doors are constructed from solid timber, usually teak. Ironmongery is either steel or brass and locks tend to be mortice. I have also seen espagnolette bolts used which seem to be a useful addition as they resist some of the methods of attack that might be directed at a door fitted with a mortice lock. Little attention is paid to the hinge side of the door to which at least hinge bolts should be added.

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Planning, footprints and security

Planning requirements with regard to the siting of buildings are well established in Qatar. The majority of residential buildings are relatively large compared with the site on which they are located and, as a consequence, their positioning with regard to the property line leaves little room for variation. Planning codes require set-backs from the property line and always assume that the buildings will be parallel with, usually, at least the front edge of the property. For most buildings this should not be a problem but, in certain cases there might be a design or security reason for having the building footprint located differently.

The most likely example of this might be a building which could be a target for bombing such as an embassy, diplomatic residence or security organisation. The reason for this is simple: where there is the possibility of a blast, those parts of the building that will receive it will be best located at an angle to the blast, deflecting the main force of the blast. This will apply in both plan and section.

So, the principles that would govern the positioning of a building with regard to its plot would include, but might not be limited to, consideration of the:

• relationship of peripheral and approach roads, particularly with regard to unprotected parts of the building,
• the ability for visual inspection and identification of approaching traffic and personnel,
• the capability to exclude vehicles and pedestrians,
• provision of off-site parking and its masking from the building, and the
• opportunities to safeguard the building by its relative location and design devices – both as part of the building design as well as the surrounding landscaping.

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Landscape design

The majority of designers engaged to work on domestic buildings tend to concentrate on the main building and leave the design of the site’s landscaping until a later stage. A landscape architect or horticulturist may be engaged to complete the work but it remains, unfortunately, relatively rare for the site’s coherent design to be considered from the outset. The larger the project, the more likely it is that the landscaping will considered relatively early in the design phase. But it is imperative that a common sense or, preferably, informed approach is taken in this area of design from the point of view of security right at the outset of the project.

I have written elsewhere that the space around a building is not to be considered as residual with the imperative that it is treated to ameliorate its condition: rather that it is to be designed at the same time as the adjacent internal spaces of the building, and integrated with them. This means that the security aspects are to be considered along with both the securing of the buildings as well as the more decorative aspects of landscaping. This applies both to the activities to be associated with those external spaces as well as the selection of hard and soft materials to be incorporated there.

The fact that there will be a peripheral wall to the site is usually taken to concentrate the designer’s efforts within the site, and to consider the boundary wall, along with its different gates, as the first line of security, and to consider the building envelope as secondary.

Considerations

Yet the area between is seldom considered from security point of view. There are four aspects to think about:

• lighting and illumination,
• hard landscaping selection,
• plant positioning and selection and, although it is not strictly a landscaping issue but one related to the periphery of buildings,
• the keeping of animals.

Earlier I mentioned that the boundary walls of properties should be illuminated. In this I was thinking of sikkat. But this also applies to the inside of walls where illumination of the inside walls will provide a good view of an intruder while, at the same time, inhibit an intruder from dropping into the property. General illumination, focussed species lighting, task lighting and security lighting should be considered and integrated with a view to ensuring that all areas of the property are covered and visible either to residents, staff or security systems.

Hard landscaping materials should be considered, particularly from the point of view of vertical surfaces in terms of their colour and articulation. It makes no sense to provide handholds on walls. Decisions will need to be made on the degree of roughness and the conflicting concerns for reducing dust retention and discouraging climbing. Consideration should also be given to ensuring there are no easy routes out of the property through the placement of built-up hard landscaping materials.

Plant or species selection will depend on a number of factors, many of them to do with visual and environmental factors relating to the use of the external areas of the property. But it is also important to think of the material and its relationship with security. The chief considerations here are for the

• selection and placement of material to prevent or restrict ingress and egress from the site, and
• to not inhibit visual security.

It is important that material should not be planted which would, immediately or in time, aid a person climbing into or out of the property. The most obvious examples to consider are date palms which, if located too close to a boundary wall, would facilitate egress from a property, while bougainvillea with its density and thorns will discourage both ingress and egress over a wall.

In addition to this it is imperative not to create blind spots in the layout of the landscaping; there should be no areas hidden from view to those living in the property.

I also mentioned animals earlier. Many Qatari houses have animals in or around the property. Mostly these are animals used to provide food for the household though pets are also owned, particularly birds. Guard dogs are occasionally owned though there is a prohibition against handling dogs in the Muslim world though an exception is made for saluqis, which many Qataris who hunt, own. I have never seen geese in Qatar but they have a long tradition as guard animals and might be considered.

more to be written…

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Principles of secure design – a safe room

This diagram notionally illustrates an addition to many buildings where the owner feels at risk to personal attack, either as a concomitant risk from an intruder looking for valuables or from a specific personal attack: a safe room. This is a room in which people can lock themselves in with some degree of safety, usually for a relatively short period of time. It is not to be confused with a walk-in safe, though the latter are not uncommon.

Safe rooms are often associated with protection from storms, tornados and the like but, in some circumstances, they are provided against intruder attack.

This, again, is very much a specialist area as there are various degrees of protection that might be given to a safe room and professional advice must be obtained. The first problem to resolve is that of making an accurate assessment of the real or perceived risk to the occupants.

There are a number of considerations which should be investigated and defined in order that suitable planning and installations can be incorporated within the building. These should include but may not necessarily be limited to, the following – in no particular order:

• an assessment of the likely point and methods of attack,
• the length of time that the occupants are likely to have to
  • gain access to it, and
  • will occupy it, and
• the degree to which it is to be hidden.

From this a number of design factors need to be defined. Again, these will include, but may not be limited to the:

• location of the room in relation to the,
  • layout of the house,
  • access, and
  • external surfaces of the building,

• materials from which the safe room will be constructed, their junction detailing and sealing,
  • walls,
  • doors,
    • actuators, and
    • emergency release,
  • floor, and
  • ceiling,

• functions required within the safe room,
  • seating,
  • sleeping,
  • food storage and preparation,
  • sanitary,
  • monitoring,
    • basic system operations,
    • intruder identifications,
    • proximity and motion sensors,
    • audio sensors,
    • oxygen monitor,
    • smoke detector,
    • energy status,
    • lock-down,
  • defensive, and
  • communication,
    • cellular,
    • short-wave radio,
    • CB etc.

• following from this decisions will need to be made on the provision of,
  • ventilation and air-conditioning,
    • bio-chemical filtration,
    • re-breathing capability,
  • lighting,
  • water,
  • drainage, and
  • power.
    • mains, and
    • battery.

In this there are decisions to be made on the extent to which these utilities are separate from the main utilities and, by extension, to what extent they should be hidden or masked.

You can see from the above that it is very easy to over-design this aspect of a building. Many safe rooms are, and look like normal rooms in a house. Cellars in basements are often used, as are bathrooms as the facilities there will be useful. But cupboards, pantries, store rooms and the like may also be used. The key item that tends to give them away are their doors. Some also have their floors raised to prevent flammable liquid attacks underneath the door.

There’s much more that might be written on this item, but this is perhaps enough to cover the basics sufficiently to give an indication of what needs to be thought of in the initial stages. There are a number of issues that should be considered but which might not come to mind, but in the main they can be identified from a careful examination based on the line items above. If in doubt, put yourself in the position of the attacker…

Safes

This subject does not really fall within the area of the notes on this page but will be dealt with elsewhere.

more to be written…